

# Model Checking

Wintersemester 2018/2019

Prof. Dr. Heike Wehrheim

WS 18/19

## Orga I

Old exam regulations:

- area: software technology and informations systems
- 4 ECTS
- modules: III.1.1, III.1.5

New exam regulations:

- Focus area: software engineering
- 6 ECTS
- course is a module on its own

## Orga II

Course consists of three parts:

- Lectures (approximately first half of term)
- Lab part (second half)
- Reading and summary writing

## Orga III

Depending on version, different requirements

- old regulations:
  - all of the lecture part
  - oral examination
  - prerequisite for oral exam (Studienleistung):  
**70/30-rule:** in 70% of the exercise sheets have 30% of the total points
  - no lab, no reading & writing
- new regulations:
  - as in old regulations (70/30-rule)
  - + 50% of lab exercises
  - + summary of 1 book chapter

## Orga IV

Heike Wehrheim

Office hours: by appointment

email: wehrheim@uni-paderborn.de

Lecture & Tutorial:

Lecture: Tue, 9 - 11, O1.258

Wed, 9 - 11, O1.258

Tutorial: Jürgen König, jkoenig@mail.upb.de

Wed, 14 - 16, O1.258

## Orga V

Lab part:

- starts approximately second half of term
- Manuel Töws, mtoews@mail.uni-paderborn.de
- Wed, 14 - 16, O1.258

## Homework

Homework assignments every week  
(until lecture part is over)

- first one on Friday in Panda
- solutions must be handed in via Panda
- submitted in groups of 2 - 4 students
- exercises discussed during tutorial

## Reading

Books:

- E. Clarke, O. Grumberg, D. Peled: Model Checking, MIT Press, 1999.
- Ch. Baier, J.-P. Katoen: Principles of Model Checking, MIT Press, 2008.

## Other material

- Slides (available after lecture in Panda)
- examples, (mainly) on the board, partly hand-out

## Part I

### Basics

### 1 Introduction

### 2 Modelling

## Motivation

Software everywhere in daily life:

- mobile phones,
- cars,
- medical applications,
- banking,
- . . . .

The more software is used, the more drastic the consequences of software failures  
and

with an increasing complexity of the software it gets harder to avoid software failures.

## Why avoid failures?

Train accidents:



Montparnasse, 1895




Rasender Roland, 2004

Today: software controls points, gates, signalling, ...

## System development

Design processes, e.g. waterfall model (old)



## Validation - Testing

**Correctness:** System should meet requirements

Waterfall model: checked via **testing**

Methods: Blackbox/Whitebox testing, test coverage

Advantage:

- relatively easy (and cheap)

Disadvantage:

- errors found late (better: incremental processes)
- often not systematic
- incomplete

"Testing can only show the presence of errors, never their absence." (E. Dijkstra)

## Validation - Simulation

Different option: **simulation**

simulate runs of the model (arbitrarily chosen)

advantage:

- on the model, thus in early phase

disadvantage:

- only some runs inspected (similar to testing)

used in hardware design

## Validation - Verification

### Verification:

mathematical **proof of the correctness** of a model/program with respect to the requirements

needs: **formal** description of model and requirements

→ additional costs: more time, experts needed

drawback:

might be infeasible → combination with testing

## Verification - why?

Consequences of incorrect software/hardware:

- 1 Danger to human lifes  
airbag goes off without reason, trains collide, ...
- 2 High costs
  - Ariane 5:  $\approx$  500 million dollars  
overflow error in a conversion floating point to integer
  - Intel Pentium:  $\approx$  500 million dollars  
error in floating point division

## Recent bug (2014)

Intel Haswell processor

### HSW136. Software Using Intel® TSX May Result in Unpredictable System Behavior

**Problem:** Under a complex set of internal timing conditions and system events, software using the Intel TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) instructions may result in unpredictable system behavior.

**Implication:** This erratum may result in unpredictable system behavior.

**Workaround:** It is possible for the BIOS to contain a workaround for this erratum.


**Status:** For the steppings affected, see the *Summary Table of Changes*.

## Verification - how?


A proof of correctness, how can this be achieved?

- depends on the type of system


**transformational systems**



**reactive systems**




## Transformational systems




Examples: compiler, sorting programs, book keeping program is implementing a **function** from an input (state) into an output (state)

## Transformational systems



Examples: compiler, sorting programs, book keeping program is implementing a **function** from an input (state) into an output (state)

requirements denotable by "Hoare Triples"



## Hoare Triple

Precondition - program - postcondition

$$\{p\}S\{q\}$$

"if  $p$  holds and we execute  $S$  then afterwards  $q$  holds"

Example:  $\{y \geq 0\}x := y\{x \geq 0\}$

in addition: proof of termination

## Verification of transf. systems

Deductive verification: axioms + proof rules

e.g. a rule for sequential composition

$$\frac{\{p\}S_1\{q\}, \{q\}S_2\{r\} \quad \text{premise}}{\{p\}S_1; S_2\{r\} \quad \text{conclusion}}$$

if the premises holds for the components, the conclusion can be deduced for the sequential composition of components

rules for all constructs of programs, including parallel composition

$\Rightarrow$  **deductive verification**

## Deductive verification

Advantage:


- complete (often)
- verification of programs with infinite state space

Disadvantage:

- tedious
- proofs done by hand / with help of theorem prover
- Hoare-style proofs not for reactive systems

(however, deductive verification possible for reactive systems as well)

## Reactive systems (1)



Set of components, executing in parallel and communicating with each other

## Reactive systems (2)

Characteristica:

- parallelism, distribution
- reactivity
- interaction with an environment, usually no termination
- high complexity, safety critical

## Examples

Examples

- embedded system (automotive sector)
- telecommunication
- elevator

requirements specify the behaviour of a system in time, not its I/O behaviour

e.g. requirement on a communication protocol

*"if process P sends a message it will not send another message until it got an acknowledgement from the receiver"*

## Specifying requirements

Requirements on reactive systems specified in **temporal logic (TL)**

Amir Pnueli

- 1977: proposal of such a logic
- 1996: Turing Award  
"For seminal work introducing temporal logic into computing science and for outstanding contributions to program and system verification."



## Example

The requirement on the communication protocol:

"if process  $P$  sends a message it will not send another message until it got an acknowledgement from the receiver"

$$\varphi = \underset{\text{globally}}{G} (snd_p(m) \Rightarrow (\neg snd_p(nxt(m)) \underset{\text{until}}{U} rcv_p(ack)))$$

## What's now verification?

Question (correctness):

does the model meet the requirements?

formally:

$$\underset{\text{System model}}{M} \models \underset{\text{Requirement (in TL)}}{\varphi} \quad ?$$

## Verification

Proof of  $M \models \varphi$

- Term **model checking**  
"is the system a model of the formula"
- in general undecidable: Theorem of Rice
- beginning of 80th:  
Clarke & Emerson, Quielle & Sifakis  
model checking **algorithm** searches the whole state space of systems  
hence: state space needs to be finite



## Clarke, Emerson, Sifakis

Turing Award 2007

*"For their role in developing Model-Checking into a highly effective verification technology, widely adopted in the hardware and software industries."*



Ed Clarke



Allen Emerson



Joseph Sifakis

## And then?


- implementation of these algorithms  
→ tools (model checker)  
allow for a fully automatic correctness proof (for certain classes of systems)
- end of 80th, beginning 90th:  
research: larger systems  
efficient representation of state (BDDs)  
reduction techniques
- '90, '00  
industrial applications (in particular hardware)  
research departments (IBM, Intel, Motorola, Siemens, Microsoft)

## Today

Research today:

- systems with large (or infinite state space)
- software model checking (C, Java)
- combination of different techniques:  
deductive verification, constraint-solving, static analysis, heuristic search, ...

## Model checking – Big picture



## What's needed ...

- 1 Formal description of models  $\rightarrow M$
- 2 Temporal logic formula  $\rightarrow \varphi$
- 3 Def. of  $M \models \varphi$
- 4 Algorithms for checking  $M \models \varphi$
- 5 Tools implementing these algorithms
- 6 Clever people being able to develop formal models and write formulae

this course: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
at the end you belong to 6

## Success stories

Verification of the floating point unit of Pentium4 (2001)  
one error found

Verification of a cache protocol in the IEEE-Futurebus+  
(1992)  
several errors found

SLAM/ Static Driver Verifier (2000 - 2004)  
verification of Windows-XP Drivers

## First example (1)

Mutual exclusion of two processes

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} l_0 : \text{while } true \text{ do} \\ \quad NC_0 : \text{wait} (turn = 0); \\ \quad CR_0 : turn := 1 \\ \quad \text{od;} \\ \hat{l}_0; \end{array} \parallel \begin{array}{l} l_1 : \text{while } true \text{ do} \\ \quad NC_1 : \text{wait} (turn = 1); \\ \quad CR_1 : turn := 0 \\ \quad \text{od;} \\ \hat{l}_1; \end{array} \right]$$

$l_0, l_1, CR_0, \dots$ : labels,  $\parallel$ : parallel composition  
NC: non-critical section, CR: critical section  
(wait: busy waiting)


## First example (2)

Semantics: [Kripke structure](#)

- describes state space
- state: evaluation of variables + program counter
- transitions: state changes

plus atomic propositions (predicates on variables)  
e.g.  $turn = 0$

## A Kripke structure



## Requirements

- 1. Mutex: process 1 and 2 never both in their critical section

$$G \neg(at\_CR_0 \wedge at\_CR_1) \quad \checkmark$$

safety property ("nothing bad happens", Lamport)

## Requirements

- 1. Mutex: process 1 and 2 never both in their critical section

$$G \neg(at\_CR_0 \wedge at\_CR_1) \quad \checkmark$$

safety property ("nothing bad happens", Lamport)

- 2. Progress: every process can always eventually enter its critical section

$$G (F at\_CR_0), \quad G (F at\_CR_1)$$

does not hold (only under additional fairness assumption)

liveness property ("something good will happen")

## This course

We will learn something about

- two temporal logics: LTL and CTL  
LTL = linear time temporal logic  
CTL = computation tree logic
- model checking techniques
- a model checker: **SPIN** (for LTL)  
small examples  
- distributed algorithms  
- cryptographic protocols